The political economy of illegal mining: Non-state armed actors and the prospects of regulated concessioning in mineral-rich host region of Nigeria

Illegal mining in Nigeria has metastasised from a peripheral criminal activity into a deeply entrenched political economy that fuses violence, profit, and governance failure. In the mineral-rich host regions of the North-West and parts of the North-Central, the extraction of gold, lithium, and other high-value minerals is increasingly controlled by non-state armed actors who deploy coercion, displacement, and informal rule to secure access to resource-bearing land. A striking pattern shows that expatriate financiers and middlemen embedded in illicit mining networks often operate with relative safety, while indigenous communities whose ancestral lands sit atop mineral deposits are violently rendered internally displaced on their own soil. Mineral wealth, rather than delivering development, has thus been converted into fuel for banditry, arms proliferation, and the erosion of state legitimacy. This study used political economy of conflict framework to interrogates whether regulated concessioning can realistically offer a pathway toward sustainable development in volatile, mineral-rich host regions. Study leveraged on qualitative research design. Findings from the study shows that non-state armed actors structurally govern this illicit economy, using coercion to control sites and displace communities, transforming mineral wealth into a self-financing conflict economy. The research challenges views of illegal mining as primarily livelihood-driven, highlighting instead organized elite collusion and governance capture. It assesses regulated concessioning as a potential pathway to sustainable development, concluding it is viable only if integrated with robust security and governance measures. The study recommends a deliberately provocative yet pragmatic policy alternative of structured, security-backed concessioning of mineral-rich regions under strict national conditions. These include mandatory local value addition of at least 40 percent prior to export, enforceable community benefit frameworks such that the ministry of mines should emphasise community ownership of artisanal mining as a way of reducing foot soldiers available for artisanal mining for bandits and terrorists, compulsory infrastructure development, enhanced federal security oversight, and the designation of controlled mining zones to prevent smuggling and illicit airlifting of minerals. The study contends that regulated concessioning if anchored in security, transparency, and community participation can transform Nigeria’s mineral belts from bandit-controlled extraction zones into development corridors.