Corporate governance and firm value: A systematic review

Purpose:  This study systematically reviews the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms—specifically board composition, executive compensation, and shareholder rights—and firm value. It aims to synthesise empirical findings, identify contextual variations, and highlight the theoretical and practical implications across both developed and emerging markets.

Design/Methodology/Approach: A systematic literature review was conducted, analysing more than 400 empirical and theoretical studies published between 2001 and 2025. The review integrates agency, stakeholder, and resource-dependence theories to evaluate governance–value linkages, while considering sustainability and ESG factors as moderating variables.

Findings: Results indicate that independent and diverse boards enhance monitoring and firm performance; that performance-linked executive pay aligns managerial and shareholder interests; and that robust shareholder rights reduce agency conflicts. However, these effects vary with institutional quality, ownership structure, and regulatory context.

Implications/Originality/Value: This study makes a significant contribution by consolidating fragmented governance research into an integrated framework. It highlights the increasing importance of sustainability and ESG disclosure in shaping governance effectiveness and guiding policymakers, investors, and corporate leaders seeking to optimise governance for long-term value creation.